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NOTES
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPECTOR MOTOR
SERVICE CASE
By
MANUEL KRAUS, ESQ.'

The recent decision in the Spector Motor Service case decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States on March 26, 1951, has caused a flurry in those states
having similar taxing statutes, among which is the State of Pennsylvania.
The legislatois are busy trying to devise means to tax those companies now
made "exempt" by the Spector decision. Administrative, as well as the Attorney
General's offices, are busy trying to determine whether their statutes are broad
enough to inciude companies like the Spector Company within its confines.
We must say that the decision in the Spector case has at least tended to clarify
and perhaps better understand the present trend of the decisions with respect to
the commerce clause effecting those companies engaged exclusively in interstate
commerce.
There is no prohlem involved when a company is 'engaged in both intra and
interstate commerce in the operation of its business. The cases are clear on this
point. If the tax is properly apportioned to avoid multiple taxation, it has been up
held.
The serious problems arise in those cases where the companies are engaged sole,y and exclusively in interstate commerce. The early doctrine that the various states
could not impc.sc a tax on a company exclusively engaged in interstate commerce was
based on the theory that a state could not keep a foreign company so engaged out of
its jurisdiction nor could a state require or exact a tax as a condition precedent
to its entrance in such state of a company solely engaged in interstate commerce. It
followed, therefore, fhat since it could not impose a tax as a condition to its beginning business, it wouid not impose a tax for the privilege of doing any exclusive
interstate business. The State of Connecticut sought to impose on foreign corporations a tax or excise upon its franchise for the privilege of carrying on or doing
*LL.B. University of Pittsburgh, 1926; Former Assistant City Solicitor, Pittsburgh, 1934;
Former Deputy Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1935-39; Member of Tax Session
of Pennsylvania Bar Association.
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business within the state under the Connecticut Corporation Business Tax Act of
1935.1
The tax was measured by the Lntire net income at the rate of 2%, but reasonably and properly apportioned to the company's activities in that state. It was authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission to do certain interstate trucking and
by the Connecticut Public Utility Commission to do part of such interstate trucking
in Connecticut. The company filed with the Secretary of the State of Connecticut
a certificate of its intorporation in Missouri and designated an agent in Connecticut
for service of process and also paid a state fee required in that connection. It was
not authorized by the State of Connecticut to do intrastate trucking and did not
engage in such activity.
The company transports freight by motor truck between the East and West,
maintained two terminals in Connecticut which it leased, and owned eight pickup
trucks used for less than truckload shipments to bring freight from its shipper to
either of the two torminals. It employed 27 full-time workers in Connecticut with
a weekly payroll of $1,200.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut sustained the imposition of the tax even
though the tax was held by that court to be a tax for the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce. The U. S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Connecticut court on the theory that since the tax was a franchise for the privilege
of carrying on or doing an interstate business within the state, it was offensive to
the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
It is interesting to note that the U. S. Supreme Court relied heavily on the fact
that the state court unequivocally determined the tax to be a tax on the corporation's
franchise for the privilege of carrying on exclusively interstate transportation in the
state. 2 It went on to say that it made no difference that Connecticut might have
obtained the same tax had it imposed one for the privilege of using its highways
or imposed an ad valorem property tax, saying:
"The answer in the instant case has been made clear by the courts of Connecticut. It is not a matter of labels. The incidence of the tax provides the answer.
The courts of Connecticut have held that the tax before us attaches solely to the
franchise of petitioner to do interstate business. The State is not precluded from
imposing taxes upon other activities or aspects of this business which, unlike the
1 Sec. 418c. Imposition of Tax. "Every mutual savings bank, savings and loan association and
building and loan association doing business in this state, and every other corporation or association
carrying on business in tbir state which isrequired to report to the collector of internal revenue for

the district in which such corporation or association has its principal place of business for the
purpose of assessment, collection and payment of an income tax (with exceptions not material here)
*

.

. shall pay, annually, a tax or excise upon its franchise for the privilege of carrying on or doing

business within the state, such tax to be measured by the entire net income as herein defined received by such corporation or association from business transacted within the state during the income
year and to be asiessed tt the rate of two per cent; ..."
2 Stanley Work v. Hackett 122 Conn. 547, 551, 190 A. 743.
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privilege of doing interstate business, are subject to the sovereign power of the
State. Those toxes may be imposed although their payment may come out of the
funds derived from petitioner's interstate business, provided the taxes are so
imposed that their burden will be reasonably related to the powers of the State
and non-discriminatory.
"This court heretofore has struck down, under the Commerce Clause, state
taxes upon the privilege of carrying on a business that was exclusively interstate in
character. The constitutional infirmity of such a tax persists no matter how fairly it
is apportioned to business done within the state." 8
The decision in this case came as a welcome surprise to the practitioners,
'especially in Penihsylvania, because since the inception of this case the taxing
officers of the Commonwealth have made every effort to seek out those companies
who were doing the same type of business as the Spector Mctor Service Company
and who did not register and of course did not file tax returns in Pennsylvania. To
assist them in this search, the Department of Revenue requested the Bureau of Employment and Unemployment Compensation of the Department of Labor and
Industry to submit lists of employers against which lists they checked to ascertain
which companies were registered in Pennsylvania.
Let us leave this case for the moment to see how it can be reconciled with
the Memphis Natural Gas Company case decided by the U. S. Supreme Court
on June 21, 1948. 4 In this case the State of Mississippi imposed a franchise or excise tax on all foreign corporations doing business in that state to $1.50 for each
$1000 of the value of the capital used, invested, or employed within the state.
The Act defines "doing business" as including "each and every act, power or
privilege exercised in this state, as an incident to, or by virtue of the powers and
privileges acquired by the nature of such organization". The Mississippi Act further
provided "it being the purpose of this section to require the payment of a tax measur'ed by the amount of capital or its equivalent for which such organizations receive the benefit and protection of the government and the laws of the state." 5
8The court cited with approval the Alpha Portland Cement case which is discussed here later.
4 Memphis Natural Gas Company v. Stone, 335 U. S. 80, 92 L. Ed. 1832.
5 9314: "For the year 1940 and annually therafter, there shall be and is hereby imposed, levied

and assessed upon every corporation, association or joint stock company, as hereinbefore defined,
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of some other state, territory or country,
or organized and existing without any specific statutory authority, now, or hereafter doing business
within this state, as hereinbefore defined, a franchise or excise tax equal to $1.50 of each $1,000
or fraction thereof of the value of capital used, invested or employed within this state, except as
hereinafter provided. It being the purpose of this section to require the payment of a tax by all
organizations not organized under the laws of this state, measured by the amount of capital or its
equivalent, for which such organization receives the benefit and protection of the government and
laws of the state."
The statute defined "doing business" to "mean and include each and every act, power or
privilege exercised or enjoyed in this State, as an incident to, or by virtue of the powers and privileges
acquired by the nature of such organization, whether the form of existence be corporate, associate,
joint stock company or common law trust."
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The facts in this case were stipulated and were not in dispute. The Memphis
Natural Gas Company is a Delaware corporation, which owns and operates a pipe
line for the transportation of natural gas. The line runs from the Monroe Gas
Field in Louisiana through the States of Arkansas, and Mississippi to Memphis and
other points in the State of Tennessee. Approximately 135 miles of the pipe line
lie within Mississippi. At two points within that state are compressing stations. The
company has never engaged in any intrastate commerce in Mississippi. The company
has never qualified to do an intrastate business in Mississippi. It has no agent for
the service of process and has no office in that state. The only employees and
representatives in Mississippi are those necessary to maintain the pipe line and its
auxiliary appurtenances. The company in opposing the tax argued that the state
of Mississippi was without authority to impose tax because it was engaged exclusively in interstate commerce. This fact was not denied by the state. The Mississippi Supreme Court however sustained the tax on the theory that it was not a
tax on interstate commerce as such, but a recompense for the protection of the lawful activities carried on in the state by the company, these local activities being the
maintenance, repair and the manning of the facilities of the system throughout
the 135 miles of its line in that state.
The U. S. Supreme Court in affirming the decision of the state court agreed
that the tax imposed was not a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce in Mississippi, but a tax imposed for the protection of the property and
activities of the company for which the state and not the U. S. gives protection,
and therefore the state is entitled to compensation when the tax cannot be said
to be an unreasonable burden or a toll on interstate business. It would be interesting
to note here the reaconing of Justice Reed who wrote the opinion and that of Justice
Rutledge in his concurring opinion. Justice Reed said:
"The Mississippi excise has no more effect upon the commerce than any of
the instances just recited. The events giving rise to this tax were no more essential
to the interstate commerce than those just mentioned or ad valorem taxes. We think
that the state is within its constitutional rights in exacting compensation under
this statute for the protection it affords the activities within its borders. Of course,
the interstate commerce could not be conducted without these local activities. But
that fact is not conclusive. These are events apart from the flow of commerce. This
is a tax on activities for which the state, not the United States, gives protection and
the state is entitled to compensation when its tax cannot be said to be an unreasonable burden or a toll on the interstate business."
Justice Rutledge, in agreeing with the result, reasoned:
"So here I do not think that the local activities for the protection of which
the Mississippi tax purports in terms to be laid become separate from the interstate business which petitioner conducts in Mississippi, either by reason of the
apportionment -r otherwise. But they are incidents of carrying on that business
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taking place in Mississippi and only there, for which Mississippi affords protection
received from no other state or the United States. Nor can any other state give
that protection. For that portion of the business and the protection given it, I
think the state is entitled to levy such a tax as has been placed here."
Now, let us examine these two cases. In the Spector case the maintenance of
terminals, pickup trucks, employees, etc. was primarily for the purpose of facilitating the flow of freight from Connecticut across its borders. In the Memphis case,
the maintenanct of compressing stations, maintenance men and other employees
was for the sole purpose of facilitating the flow of gas across its border. What thLn
is the difference in these two cases? Obviously, it is by reason of the fact that
in the Spector case the tax was imposed on the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce, whereas in the Gas Company case the tax was imposed as a recompense
for the protection of the property of the company in that state, the former illegal;
the latter valid, the former objectionable to the commerce clause of the U. S. Constitution; the latter not objectionable.
It therefort appears that where a company is engaged solely in interstate
commerce, a state cannot exact a tax for the privilege of engaging in such commerce,
but can exact a tax as previously mentioned for the protection afforded the company in the taxing state.
If the Spe:tor Motor Company operated in Mississippi, the U. S. Supreme
Court would have been compelled to hold the tax valid. On the other hand, if
the Memphis Natural Gas Company had operated in Connecticut, the U. S. Supreme
Court would have been compelled to hold that the tax was invalid.
The Pennsylvania Franchiseand Corporate Net Income Tax laws are not designed according to the Mississippi statute, but according to the Connecticut
statute. Let us examine a more or less similar situation and try to reconcile it with
the previous two cases if we can.
You are all probably familiar with the Alpha Portland Cement Company
case decided in 1925 involving an income tax imposed by the State of Massachusetts.6 This company was a corporation organized under the laws of New Jersey.
Its business was manufacturing and the sale of cement with its principal office
at Easton, Pennsylvania. Its mills were located in several states other than Massachusetts from which shipments were made to various parts of the U. S. and
foreign countries. It maintained an office in Boston with a district manager in
charge and several clerks where its correspondence and other natural business activities in connection with the receipt of orders and shipments of goods were conducted. This office was frequently used by traveling salesmen who solicited orders
in Massachusetts and the other New England States.

9 Alpha

Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts 268 U. S. 203, 69 L. Ed. 916.
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Orders were taken and transmitted at the Boston Office to the principal
office in Easton, Penna., and after being passed upon and accepted, the goods
were shipped and invoiced directly to the customer.
The State of Massachusetts sought to impose on all foreign corporations with
respect to the carrying on or doing of business in that commonwealth, an income
tax bas'ed upoa net income properly apportioned. 7 The tax was sustained by the
Massachusetts Supreme Court on the theory that the same tax was levied on domestic
as well as foreign corporations and fairly apportioned to the business done within
the commonwealth and that the tax was not discriminatory and was not offensive
to the commerce clause of the U. S. Constitution. The Commonwealth admitted,
however, that the tax was for the privilege of doing business in Massachusetts
and since properly apportioned, it was valid.
The U. S. Supreme Court in overruling the decision of the Massachusetts
court stated that even though the tax is properly apportioned, since it was imposed
for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce and even though it was not
made a condition precedent to the doing of business, it still was invalid, saying:
"The loca! business of a foreign corporation may support an excise measured
in any reasonable way, if neither interstate commerce nor property beyond the
state is taxed. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 65
L. Ed. 165, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 45, approved such an excise measured by income
reasonably attriLuted to interstate business; but nothing there said was intended to
modify well-established principles. It must be read with the essential facts in mind.
Local business was a sufficient basis for the excise, and there was no taxation of
interstate commerce or property beyond the state...
"The excise challenged by plaintiff in error is not materially different from
the one declared unconstitutional in Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts, and cannot
be 'enforced against a foreign corporation which does nothing but interstate business within the state. The introduction of an extremely complicated method for
calculating the amount of the exaction does not change its nature or mitigate the
burden."
Now, we turn to the West Publishing Company case decided by the U. S.
Supreme Court in 1946.8 As you know this company was in the law book publishing
business, a Minnesota corporation. The company shipped books and other publications into California nursuant to orders taken by its salesmen who devoted their
full time to their jobs in California. These tmployees had space in lawyers' offices
7 Section 39, "Every foreign corporation shall pay annually, with respect to the carrying on or
doing of business by it within the Commonwealth, an excise equal to the sum of the following ...
(1) An amount equal to $5 per thousand upon the value of th corporate excess employed by it
within the Commonwealth. (2) An amount equal to 21/2per cent of that part of its net income, as
defined in P. 30 ard in this section, which is derived from business carried on within the Commonwealth . . "
8 West Publishing Co. v. McColgan 328 U. S. 833.
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in exchange for the use of books stored there. The California employees were
authorized to and did receive payments on orders, collected deliquent accounts and
made adjustments on complaints of customers.
The State of California cognizant of the fact that a state may not exact a
tax for the privilege of doing an exclusively interstate business, imposed an income
tax on those corporations not subject to its franchise tax. It made net income
the subject as vell as the measure of its Corporation Income Tax. It limited the
measure of the tax to income from California sources which was understood to
mean income from sources of books and periodicals delivered in California.' The
California Supreme Court sustained the assessment 10 holding that "a tax on
net income from interstate commerce as distinguished from a tax on the privilege of
engaging in intcrstate commerce does not conflict with the commerce clause."
The U. S. Supreme Court unanimously affirmed this decision by a per curiam
opinion.
Here we have two cases again where the activities are alike, both subjected
to state taxes and both engaged solely in interstate commerce and yet we find
that in the Cement case the tax was invalid as again it was imposed for the privilege
of doing business. And, in the PublishingCompany case, the tax was valid because
it was a tax on net income and not on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
In contrast to the above taxes which were imposed by the various states on
businesses exclusively engaged in interstate commerce, it is interesting to note the
case of Joseph D. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Mining Company, 309 U. S.
33, 84 L. Ed. 565. In that case the City of New York imposed a tax upon purchasers for consumption of tangible personal property.
The tax was fixed at " 2 percentum upon the amount of the receipts from
every sale in the City of New York," "sales" being defined as "any transfer of
title or possession or both . . . in any manner or by any means whatsoever for
a consideration or any agreement therefor." The act further provided that the
tax "shall be paid by the purchaser to the vendor for and on account of the City of
New York." The act authorized the vendor to bill the purchaser separately for
the tax and collect the same and if not paid to the seller, the buyer was required
to file a eeturn and pay the tax within a certain time.

9 The Corporate Income Tax Act provided: "There shall be levied, collected and paid for each
taxable year, a tax at the rate of 4 per cent upon the net income of every corporation derived from
sources within this state on or after January 1, 1937 . . . income from sources within this state
includes income from tangible or intangible property located or having a situs in this state and income
from any activities cairied on in this state, regardless of whether carried on in intrastate, interstate
or foreign commerce."
10 West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 166 P. 2d 861.
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The ultimate burden of the tax, both in form and in substance was thus
laid upon the buyer for consumption of tangible personal property and measured
by the sales price.
The Berwind-White Company was a Pennsylvania corporation engaged iii
the production of coal from its mines in that state and in selling the same to consumers and deilers. It maintained a sales office in New York for the use of its
New York customers. The coal moves by rail from mine in Pennsylvania to dock
in New Jersey, aad then by barge to the point of delivery in New York. All the
sales contracts with the New York customers were entered into in New York
City and called foi the delivery of the coal by the company by barge along side
the purchaser's plants or steamships.
The Supreme Court of New York decided in favor of the taxpayer. The
Supreme Court of the United States in reversing the decision of the Supreme
Court of New York said, speaking of the act, "it does not aim at or discriminate
against interstate commerce. It is laid upon every purchaser within the state of
goods for consumption, regardless of whether they have been transported in interstate commerce. Its only relation to the commerce arises from the fact that immediately preceding transfer of possession to the purchaser within the state, which is
the taxable event regardless of the time and place of passing title, the merchandise
has been transported in interstate commerce and brought to its journey's end. Such
a tax has no different effect upon interstate commerce than a tax on th'e 'use' of
property which has just been moved in interstate commerce or the familiar property
tax on goods by the state of destination at the conclusion of their interstate journey.;.
From an examination of these cases, it is apparent that companies engaged
exclusively in iriterstate commerce cannot be taxed for the privilege of engaging
in interstate commerce even though the tax is properly apportioned, but may be
taxed otherwise on those activities.
In conclusion, we can say that states that desire to collect a fair share from
those companies engaged solely in interstate commerce, can do so by carefully
worded legislation.
Pennsylvania has in part don'e so by House Bill 1303 which has been signed
by the Governor and enacted into law.
(This Bill his not received an Act Number up to this time.)
The Act imposes "a property tax" based on net income derived from sources
within Pennsylvania of certain corporations doing business in the State. The tax
is properly apportioned by the use of a formula in some respects similar to that
contained in the Corporate Net Income and Franchise Tax Acts.

1931
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This Act was fashioned after the California and Mississippi statutes which
imposed the tax oLn companies engaged exclusively in interstate commerce and
which acts were sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States in the West
Publishing Company and the Memphis Natural Gas Company cases referred to
above. It is to be noted that the Tax is not on the "privilege" of doing business
in Pennsylvania but on the activities carried on and on the rights enjoyed by virtue
of the powers aranted to the corporation by the Commonwealth.
It seems that, therefore, those companies who have enjoyed immunity from
taxation either under the Franchise or Corporate Net Income Tax Acts will now
be liable under this "property tax act". There might be some food for thought as
to the proper classification of companies engaged both in intra and interstate
commerce and those solely engaged in interstate commerce where the former
group are liable for the Corporate Net Income Tax and Franchise Tax and the
latter group being liable only for the so-called "property tax".

